We consider a cooperative game with a bipartition that indicates which players are participating. This paper provides an analytical solution for the Shapley value when the worth of a coalition only depends on the number of participating coalition players. The computational complexity grows linearly in the number of players, which contrasts with the usual exponential increase. Our result remains true when we introduce (i) randomization of the bipartition, and (ii) randomly draw a characteristic function.
Introduction
A cooperative game (N, v) consists of a player set N and a characteristic function v ∈ F N , where F N denotes the class of functions v : 2 N → R that satisfy v( / 0) = 0. The worth v(N) of the game is the worth generated by the coalition of all n players in N. The Shapley value φ : F N → R n (Shapley [1953] ) is an allocation of this worth.
For any player i ∈ N:
where |S| is the number of players in S. It follows from (1) that the Shapley value is a linear function:
where v ∈ F N is for each S ⊆ N defined as v(S) = αw(S) + β z(S). The Shapley value is fair in the sense that it satisfies several axiomatizations (see Winter [2002] for an overview). For instance, Myerson [1980] shows that the Shapley value is the unique allocation that satisfies the following two axioms: * Erasmus University Rotterdam, Tinbergen Institute, and CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, e-mail: muns@ese.eur.nl. I am grateful to Gerard van der Laan and Casper de Vries for helpful comments.
(i) Efficiency
The sum of the allocated values adds up to the total worth of the game:
For any game (N, v) with players i and j (i = j), the loss that player i incurs after player j is removed from the game is equal to the loss that player j incurs after player i is removed from the game:
where v| S is the restriction of v to the subsets of S, and φ i ( v| S ) denotes the allocation to player i in the subgame (S, v| S ).
For each player, the number of possible subsets S in (1) equals 2 n−1 . Thus the computational complexity increases exponentially in the number of players (see e.g. Faigle and Kern [1992] ). Several papers have proposed approximation techniques where the computational complexity increases only linearly in the number of players (e.g., Fatima et al [2008] and Castro et al [2009] ). Our focus is on an exact determination of the Shapley value for a specific class of characteristic functions. Megiddo [1978] shows that the Shapley value is obtained in O(n) computations for games where players are nodes in a tree. Granot et al [2002] extend this result to heterogeneous preferences of the players. A computational complexity of O(n 2 ) is found in Deng and Papadimitriou [1994] for a game in which the players are nodes in an undirected graph. This computational complexity can never be smaller for this class of games since the number of arcs is O(n 2 ) for a complete graph.
For some classes of characteristic functions, the computational complexity of the Shapley value is polynomial in the number of players. For example, the Shapley value of a weighted majority game is computed in O(n 3 )
computations in Algaba et al [2003] . Another example is in Littlechild and Owen [1973] , who show that the computational complexity is O(n) if the worth of a coalition equals the maximal worth of a single coalition player.
We identify in Section 2 another class which has the tractable linear computational complexity. This class consists of characteristic functions where the worth only depends on the number of participating coalition players. In Section 3 it is shown that the linearity of the Shapley value implies that the computational complexity is unaffected when we (i) randomize participations, and (ii) randomly draw a characteristic function. Section 4 illustrates the results by means of an example.
Deterministic setting
We start with a deterministic version of our main result that the computational complexity is linear in the number of players when the characteristic function depends on the number of participating players. Consider a game (N, v) with n players in N. A bipartition on N indicates which players are participating. For notational convenience, we use the participation vector B ∈ [0, 1] n to characterize the bipartition:
The total number of participating players in the coalition S is given by κ S = ∑ i∈S B i , and we define κ := κ N as the total number of participating players. The following proposition enables us to obtain the Shapley value in O(n)
computations for a special class of characteristic functions.
Proposition 1. Consider the setting described above. If the characteristic function v is of the type
This means that the Shapley value of player i equals the fraction B i κ of the worth v(N) of the game.
Proof. We show that the allocation φ (v) satisfies the efficiency axiom as well as the balanced contributions axiom.
It is easy to see that φ (v) satisfies the efficiency axiom because
Obviously, this equation holds for any of the four possibilities of the pair (B i , B j ). This implies that φ (v) satisfies the balanced contributions axiom for any game (N, v), as required.
Proposition 1 makes clear that the vector φ (v) is obtained by first computing f (κ) and subsequently B i f (κ)
for each player i ∈ N. This results in a computational complexity that grows linearly in the number of players in N.
The class of characteristic functions in Proposition 1 nests the class of voting games where each player has the same weight. However, it cannot be generalized to weighted Shapley values. For an arbitrary nonzero weight vector w ∈ R n (w = 0), the balanced contributions axiom changes then into (see Kalai and Samet [1987] ):
The case w i = 0 for exactly one player i is neglected, because the weight vector would become the zero vector in the game (N\i, v| N\i ). We write the allocation in the functional form φ i ( v| S ) = w i γ S i B i f (κ S ) and show that γ S i depends on the functional form of f . This makes the simple closed form solution in Proposition 1 infeasible. The efficiency axiom imposes
If γ N i does not depend on the functional form of f , then we need to have (i)
N\i j . This shows that (i) and (ii) are both inappropriate, except for the special case w 1 = . . . = w n = 0 which corresponds with Proposition 1.
Stochastic setting
We allow the participation vector B to be a random vector. Besides the fact that the outcome B i of player i becomes stochastic, the outcome B i can be correlated with the outcome B j of another player j. We assume that T different realizations of the elements in B represent the probability distribution of B.
First, the characteristic function is some given deterministic function. Then, we generalize the setting to a randomization over a set of characteristic functions. 
In words, the Shapley value of player i equals the expectation of the fraction B i κ of the realization of the worth function κ f (κ).
Proof. Along the lines of the proof of Proposition 1, we show that the allocation of φ (v) satisfies the efficiency axiom as well as the balanced contributions axiom. It is easy to see that φ (v) satisfies the efficiency axiom because by the linearity of the expectations operator
Then, the balanced contributions axiom is necessarily satisfied if for any realizationB of B: This implies that φ (v) satisfies the balanced contributions axiom, as required.
Since we compute B i f (κ) for each of the n players and each of the T realizations of B, it is straightforward that the computational complexity of φ (v) grows linearly in n as well as in T . This result can be generalized to the setting where the characteristic function v admits v
i . The Shapley value of player i is then given by B (t) ). 1 Proposition 2 refers to the special case h ≡ 1 T . Notice that the characteristic function and the Shapley value remain deterministic after introducing randomization in B. 
Randomization over characteristic functions
Roughly speaking, the Shapley value is simply a weighted average of Shapley values where the weight P(v =v) is attached to the Shapley value of the game (N,v) . The factor gv is only a scaling factor for the Shapley value of (N,v).
Proof. The characteristic function of the composed game (N,v) can be written as
. By the linearity of the Shapley value and the linearity of the expectations operator:
This proposition is easily generalized to linear characteristic functionsv(S) = ∑v ∈V αvv(S). The corresponding
Proposition 3 is then the special case αv = P(v =v).
It is known for each of the T realizations of B to which game (N,v) it belongs. Therefore, the computational complexity of φ (v) increases linearly in n, the number of players, and in T , the number of realizations of B.
Example
Let the set Nv contain the non-null players in the game (N,v) . There are at least 2 players in this set for eachv ∈ V .
Only a null player does not affect κ S = ∑ i∈S B i for any S ∈ 2 N . Thus κ := κ N = κ Nv and P(B i = 0) = 1 if and only if i / ∈ Nv. The joint distribution of B and v is known. This means that after selecting a characteristic functionv ∈ V ,
We define a dependence measure to measure player i's dependence on other players. This measure is the fraction of other participating non-null players given that player i is a participating player: 4
The vector ξ contains this dependence measure for each player i ∈ N. We show that the Shapley value of player i equals the product of the probability on the event {B i = 1} and the dependence measure ξ i :
As a consequence, the dependence measure ξ i is related to the Shapley value in such a way that the computational complexity of both φ (v) and ξ is linear in the number of players. We show this result by means of (i) Proposition (i) Notice thatv(S) = wv(S) + zv(S) for the separable functions
where gv = (|Nv| − 1) −1 . By Proposition 2, the Shapley value of player i associated with the characteristic function w fv (S) = E B|v κ 2 S is given by:
, it follows from Proposition 3 that gv can be interpreted as a scaling factor in determining the Shapley value ofw:
Similarly, for z:
The linearity of the Shapley value now gives the desired result (4).
(ii) We confirm the result in (4) for the following numerical example. In the game (N,v) with n = 3 players, the characteristic function is given by (3). The game is over T = 50 equally weighted periods. Player 3 is a null player during the first 20 periods, which means that the corresponding characteristic function v 1 is given by (3) with N v 1 = {1, 2}. In period 21, player 3 enters and remains in the game. The characteristic function v 2 is then given by (3) with N v 2 = {1, 2, 3}. Table 1 contains the realizations of B and v for this game. Intuitively, player 3 contributes most to the total value since player 3 participates always simultaneously with another player. Table 2 provides for each S ∈ 2 N the outcomes of the characteristic function v 1 (S) and v 2 (S). Using (1), the Shapley value distributes v 1 (N) = 1 10 and v 2 (N) = 4 30 as follows among the players:
φ 1 (v 1 ) = 2 · 0 + 1 · ( 1 /10 − 0) + 1 · (0 − 0) + 2 · ( 1 /10 − 0) 6 = 1 20 φ 2 (v 1 ) = 2 · 0 + 1 · ( 1 /10 − 0) + 1 · (0 − 0) + 2 · ( 1 /10 − 0) 6 = 1 20 φ 3 (v 1 ) = 2 · 0 + 1 · (0 − 0) + 1 · (0 − 0) + 2 · ( 1 /10 − 1 /10) 6 = 0 φ 1 (v 2 ) = 2 · 0 + 1 · ( 1 /30 − 0) + 1 · ( 2 /30 − 0) + 2 · ( 4 /30 − 1 /30) 6 = 1 20 φ 2 (v 2 ) = 2 · 0 + 1 · ( 1 /30 − 0) + 1 · ( 1 /30 − 0) + 2 · ( 4 /30 − 2 /30) 6 = 1 30 φ 3 (v 2 ) = 2 · 0 + 1 · ( 1 /30 − 0) + 1 · ( 2 /30 − 0) + 2 · ( 4 /30 − 1 /30) 6 = 1 20
We use that φ i (v) = E v [φ i (v)] = 20 50 φ i (v 1 ) + 30 50 φ i (v 2 ) to obtain the second column in Table 3 . Hence, the computations require O(n2 n T ) computations. The third and fourth column in Table 3 follow from Table 1 , but require only O(nT ) computations. Indeed, player 3 has the largest dependence measure ξ i . It follows that the second column is equal to the product of the third column and the fourth column, as predicted by (4). This means that the Shapley value is obtained in O(nT ) computations. 
